Incident
at RED LAKE ON (CYRL)
(Communication navigation surveillance/air traffic system, ATS operating irregularity)
PAG613 BEECH 55 PERIMETER AIRLINES (INLAND) LTD. IFR from Winnipeg, MB to Red Lake, ON PAG613 was on an IFR flight plan from Winnipeg to Red Lake, estimating Red Lake at 1944Z, 7,000 feet. Winnipeg ACC issued a clearance through Thunder Bay FSS for PAG613 to maintain flight on his inbound radial (230) at 1929Z (according to the Thunder Bay Site Manager, the flight crew of PAG613 did not receive this radial restriction). At 1933Z, Thunder Bay FSS requested a clearance for HLO106 and was issued the following: ATC clears HLO106 to the Winnipeg Airport via Red Lake direct to maintain 16,000, depart runway 26, make climb from 4,000 to 8,000 established on the Red Lake 245 radial at 17 DME. Do not depart until BLS364 is down and clear, code 4775. The flight crew of HLO106 were issued their clearance but did not provide an accurate readback. Only part of this inaccurate readback was detected by Thunder Bay FSS. As a result, HLO106 departed and passed through PAG613's altitude before reaching the specified DME restriction (as issued by Winnipeg ACC). Ops. impact -- unknown. S.O.B. -- unknown. O.P.I.: PAS Supplementary information from T.S.B. Initial Notification (#A99C0012): The Perimeter Airlines Beech 55, C-GEFX, was inbound to Red Lake, ON on an IFR flight plan at 7,000 feet. The Samaritan Air Service Mitsubishi MU-2B, C-FJEL, was departing Red Lake for Winnipeg, MB, on an IFR flight plan at 16,000 feet. C-FJEL was restricted to not above 4,000 feet until 17NM DME to provide separation from C-GEFX. The clearance and restriction were passed to the First Officer of C-FJEL by Thunder Bay FSS. On readback, the First Officer did not include the 4,000 foot restriction. The Thunder Bay FSS Specialist did not notice the omission and on departure, C-FJEL climbed through the altitude of C-GEFX. The crew of C-FJEL observed C-GEFX as they broke through the cloud layer. The Captain estimated the aircraft to be about one mile horizontally. Neither aircraft needed to manoeuvre to ensure safety. A review of ATS recordings confirmed the incorrect readback exchange by the First Officer of C-FJEL and the FSS Specialist. S.O.B.: C-FJEL: six (6) -- two (2) crew; four (4) passengers; C-GEFX: two (2) -- both crew.